Rights Based Fisheries Management in Canada by Crowley, R.W. & Palsson, Halldor P.
Marine Resource Evonomics, Volume 7. pp. 1-21 0736-1360/92 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the USA. All rights reserved. Copyrighl C 1992 Marine Resources Foundation
Rights Based Fisheries Management in Canada
R. W. CROWLEY
Economic and Commercial Analysis Directorate
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Ottawa, Canada KIA 0E6
H. PALSSON
Economic and Commercial Analysis Directorate
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Ottawa, Canada KIA 0E6
Abstract The conflict between efficiency and maximization of employment
colours all aspects of fisheries management in Canada, including implemen-
tation of rights based fisheries management regimes. Even though rights
based systems are strongly based on considerations of efficiency, sometimes
at the expense of maximization of employment, a number of such regimes have
been put in place in recent years. These are generally little known and little
analyzed. This paper attempts to address this gap in our knowledge by sur-
veying such .schemes. For a number of reasons outlined in the paper, rights
based regimes in Canada have not usually involved transferability or divisi-
bility of quotas. Nonetheless, efficiency gains have been made where such
schemes have been implemented. These are illustrated in case studies of the
Atlantic offshore groundfish fishery and the Atlantic purse seine herring fishery.
Keywords Fisheries management, property rights, quota values, limits on
transferability of rights, rationalization of fisheries.
Introduction
This paper surveys rights based regimes in Canada. Most of the regimes have been
adopted to address the common property nature of the fisheries. We assess the
general operation of these regimes and then describe two in detail.
In Canada, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over all "sea
coast and inland fisheries". The federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans
(DFO) regulates approximately 70,000 commercial fishermen that landed fish with
a value of $ 1,634 millions in 1989. The principal instrument for catch regulation is
the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) which is set each year for most species.
The Fisheries Act gives the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans the power ". . . in
his absolute discretion, wherever the exclusive right of fishing does not already
exist by law. to issue . . . leases and licences for fisheries or fishing. . ."' This
power to licence is elaborated in Section 34 of the Fisheries Act, which gives the
Minister the right to enact regulations for:
"(a) . . . conservation and protection offish. . . .
(d) ... operation of fishing vessels. . . .
(e) ... use of fishing gear and equipment. . . .
' Fisheries Act, Revised Statute of Canada, 1970, f-14 Sec 7.2 R. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
(g) ... terms and conditiotis under which a ... licence may be issued. . . .
(m) ... to vary the close time, fishing quota, or limit" that has been fixed by
the regulations.
The Minister's extensive powers were used only sparingly before the 1960s.
However, during the 1960s and 1970s, regulatory control of inputs increased
considerably. Input control measures consisted chiefly of season closures, gear
restrictions and area closures. This type of regulation did not solve basic problems
resulting from the common property nature of the fishery and as result, emphasis
shifted to the principal devices currently used to manage the fisheries:
Total allowable catches (TACs) by fishery.
Enterprise Allocations (EAs) or percentage shares of TACs.
Individual licences.
Vessel registration and replacement restrictions.
Regulations on fishing gear.
Area regulations by vessel class, gear and dates of operation.
The eurrent management approach was developed following severe crises on
both east and west coasts in the late 1970s. Overall, the approach has been to
extend enterprise allocations (EAs) and related quota systems to new sectors of
the fishery and subsequently to deregulate these sectors once EAs have begun to
take effect.
The thinking behind this strategy was formalized in two early 198O's Royal
Commission reports on the state of Canadian fisheries.^ The Task Force on At-
lantic Fisheries or "'Kirby Report" prefaced its recommendations with the fol-
lowing objectives for Canadian fisheries policy:
Objective 1: The Atlantic fishing industry should be economically viable on an
ongoing basis, where to be viable implies an ability to survive
down turns with only normal business failure rates and without
government assistance.
Objective 2: Employment in the Atlantic fishing industry should be maxi-
mized subject to the constraint that those employed receive a
reasonable income as a result of fishery-related activities, includ-
ing fishery-related transfer payments.
Objective 3: Fish within the 200-mile Canadian zone should be harvested and
processed by Canadians in firms owned by Canadians wherever
this is consistent with Objectives 1 and 2 and with Canada's
international treaty obligations.
It is crucial to understanding Canadian fisheries policy to appreciate the role of
"Objective 2". Employment maximization is an unstated policy objective of fish-
eries policy in many countries. And this is no less the case in Canada. However,
this objective is in fundamental confiict with Objective 1: achievement of one
compromises achievement of the other. Rights based approaches that are cur-
rently in place (especially in Atlantic Canada) implicitly or explicitly recognize the
^ Task force on Atlantic Fisheries. Navigating Troubled Waters: A New Policy for the
Atlantic Fisheries. Ottawa. December 1982 (known as the "Kirby Report" after the Com-
mission chairman. Senator Michael J. L. Kirby). Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy,
Turning the Tide: A New Policy for Canada's Pacific Fisheries. Ottawa, September. 1982
(known as the "Pearse Report" after Commissioner, Peter H. Pearse).Rights Based Management
Table 1
Rights Based Management in Canadian Fisheries, 1990, by Fishery Type of
Regime and Date of Introduction
Atlantic Fisheries
1. Herring {4RTVnWX)
2. Offshore Groundfish {All areas)
3. Northern Shrimp {2G,3K)
4. Offshore Lobster (4X,5)
5. Offshore Clam (4Vs)
6. Offshore Scallop (4X,5Ze)
7. Offshore Tuna (All areas)
8. Inshore Groundfish (4RST,3Pn)^
9. Midshore Groundfish (All Areas)'












































' Individual vessel quota were introduced into this fishery in 1977. Vessel quota were converted to
a more extensive individual quota program in 1985.
^ Applies to mobile gear, otter trawls, less than 65 foot vessels.
' There are five separate programs affecting midshore groundfish.
•* An initial individual quota system was introduced in 1972. Licenses were not transferable and
individual entitlements were small. Retired licenses were given to those in the industry based on a
"point system" that assured that the number of licenses remained stable within a designated com-
munity license area.
need to maximize employment and this compromises the efficacy of the approach.
As discussed later in this paper, however, this does not mean that there have been
no efficiency gains from rights based regimes.
Canada began seriously to apply rights based regimes to the management of
fisheries in 1982 (Table !). Prior to the establishment of enterprise allocations
(EAs) in the offshore fisheries in 1982, rights based management vi'as tried in a
number of small fisheries.'^ However, these were experiments and none really led
to wider applications of rights based management. This may seem surprising in
view of the strong tradition of "supply management" for a whole range of agri-
cultural products in Canada.**
^ For example, individual quota in Lake Winnipeg in 1972, individual vessel quota for
Atlantic offshore lobster in 1977 individual quota for B.C. abalone in 1980 and individual
quota for B.C. herring spawn-on-kelp in 1980.
•* Individual transferable quota give Ontario farmers (for example) the right to produce
specific quantities subject to the following marketing boards: The Ontario Chicken Pro-
ducers" Marketing Board, The Ontario Egg Producers' Marketing Board, The Ontario
Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers Marketing Board, The Ontario Milk Marketing Board, and
The Ontario Turkey Producers" Marketing Board.4 R. W. Crowley and H. Pals son
Prior to the 1970s, provincial fluid milk marketing boards and the flue-cured
tobacco marketing board in Ontario had successful systems of individual trans-
ferable quotas. After the federal government passed the Farm Products Marketing
Agencies Act in 1971, additional boards in other areas quickly made their quotas
enforceable and often valuable.^ The lessons learned in agriculture, however,
were not readily transferable to the fisheries. No doubt there are many reasons for
this but chief among them is the traditional role of the fishery in Atlantic Canada.
It has been not only the employer of last resort, but in many areas the employer
of only resort, and maximization of employment has often been an overriding
objective.
The Department of Fisheries and Oceans introduced rights based regimes with
EAs for the four largest offshore groundfish companies in 1982. They were sus-
pended the following year pending the restructuring of the Atlantic groundfish
industry. However, the offshore companies nonetheless continued with informal
EAs during 1983 and in 1984, DFO re-introduced EAs for the offshore ground
fishery during a five year trial (1984-88). The program was made permanent in
1989. The original program of course has been modified since 1982.
The Department introduced a separate EA regime in 1984 for the inshore
groundfish fishery on the west coast of Newfoundland (mobile gear less than 65
feet in NAFO zones 4R. 3Pn, see Figure 1). In 1985. EAs were introduced into the
offshore lobster fishery (zone 4X) and in 1986 into the offshore scallop fishery
(zone 4X). In 1987 they were introduced into the northern shrimp fishery (zone
0-2). By this time the introduction of EAs had become the de facto strategy for
fisheries management development.
This paper surveys all rights based programs in Canada and then reviews two
of the regimes in more detail. One detailed review is the offshore EA program
noted above. The offshore EA program is DFO's "flagship" in terms of fisheries
management through establishment of rights. The second is the program for trans-
ferable vessel quotas in Atlantic zone 4WX herring. This latter fishery is not
especially important in terms either of value or employment, but it was one of the
first to have vessel quota and it illustrates many key points about quota manage-
ment. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans intervened substantially from
1974-76 and again in 1983 into the 4WX herring fishery. Each intervention carried
management further in the direction of enhanced rights.
Rights Based Programs in Commercial Fisheries tn Canada
Table 1 provides a listing of Canadian fisheries with some form of property rights.
Most of these programs were introduced into "open access" fisheries. These
fisheries had generally developed into fisheries where too many fishermen and
boats earned too low average incomes.
The academic community has actively encouraged the introduction of rights
based management regimes. Moloney and Pearse (1979) advocated quantitative
rights which could be allocated annually, though they stated a preference for
perpetual rights.^ Scott and Neher (1981) recomjnended that "the common prop-
For a discussion of the role of marketing boards in Canada, see C. Green. Canadian
Industrial Organization and Policy. Toronto McGraw-Hill-Ryerson. 1985, pp. 416-439.
*• David G. Moloney and Peter H. Pearse, "Quantitative rights as an instrument for regu-
lating commercial fisheries". Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada. 1979. 36
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Figure I. Subareas and Divisions of the NAFO Convention Area and limits of the Cana-
dian fishing zone (East coast).
erty system of open access to each fishery should be replaced by a system of
individual and exclusive rights of access or capture, or both".^ To yield full
economic benefits their rights based system would have rights that are ". . . mar-
ketable, divisible, specific with respect to species, time, location and gear
^ Anthony Scott and Philip A. Neher, (editors). The Public Regulation of Commercial
Fisheries in Canada, Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada. 1981, p. 41.6 /?. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
(STLG), and risk and pre-assignment".* The Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries
echoed this in its recommendation 7.
For all regimes in Table I, the "species, time, location and gear" stipulation
is met, but transferability and pre-assignment of rights is not. When rights have
been introduced, industry has usually resisted transferability and pre-assignment.
In subsequent rounds of program design, however, they have often conceded the
need for transferability. Existing rights based fisheries are designated IQ (indi-
vidual quota) if quota are not transferable and ITQ (individual transferable quota)
if they are.
In what follows, a rights based program is considered successful if it results in:
• Increased incomes of participants,
• Respected catch limits.
• Respected gear regulations and other conservation rules.
• Exit of labour and capital from a particular fishery.
Biological Characteristics of the Fisheries
The fisheries where rights based programs apply are heterogenous in terms of
numbers of species and stock characteristics. Some are single species fisheries.
Others are multi-species. Some species are long lived. Others are not. Most stocks
reflect year-class developments. Shrimp are the result of essentially independent
generations.
It is important to note that precision in stock assessments varies across rights-
based fisheries. Stock estimates normally are subject to errors of plus or minus 20
per cent for groundfish and slightly higher for pelagjcs.^ Some stocks are declin-
ing. Others are growing or cannot be assessed using standard biological meth-
ods.'** To date, there is no evidence that biological factors translate in any pre-
dictable way into a prerequisite for a successful rights based program. Hence,
rights based fisheries have reflected a variety of biological conditions.
From Table 1, the following rights based programs are single species flsheries;
herring (4RTVnWX), northern shrimp (2G.3K), offshore lobster (4X,5), offshore
clams (4Vs) and offshore tuna on the Atlantic coast; and geoduck, abalone and
herring are all single species programs on the Pacific coast.
Multi-species rights based programs are offshore, mid-shore and inshore
(4RST,3Pn) groundflsh (Atlantic) and the Lake Erie. Lake Winnipeg and Arctic
fisheries. The multi-species program in Lake Erie has over 240 boats and a com-
bination of short and long lived species. It is a model fishery in all of the success
Mbid, p. 41.
* Canadian experience is similar to experience assessing stocks for the North Sea. For a
survey, see K. Brander. "How well do working groups predict catches? '" Journal du
Conseil International pour TExploration de la Mer, Vol 43. pp. 245-252. For a review of the
Canadian experience, see Denis Rlvard and Malcolm G. Foy, "An Analysis of Errors in
Catch Projections for Canadian Atlantic Fish Stocks", Journal of the Fisheries and Aquatic
Science, 1987, Vol 44, pp. 967-981.
'" N. A. Sloan and P. A. Breen, "Northern abalone. haliotis kamtschatkana, in British
Columbia; fisheries and synopsis of life history information", Canadian Special Publication
in Fisheries and Aquatic Science, 1989. There is no known method for age determination
of abalone.Rights Based Management 7
terms noted above: fishermen comply with conservation regulations; participants
respect catch limits and gear regulations; and incomes have increased consider-
ably.
Number of Participants and Landing Sites/Ports
The number of participants in rights based programs varies. Of course, the ad-
ministrative burden of a rights based program increases in general with the num-
ber of companies, vessels and landing sites. The experience in Canadian fisheries,
however, suggests that large numbers of vessels, fishermen and landing sites can
be effectively managed under such schemes (see discussion below). The first
order of business is to ensure that only legal gear is used to harvest fish. The
second is to ensure a proper paper trail from a point of landing in order to monitor
quota effectively. Such data are part of the administrative procedures for several
successful rights based programs. It is notable that where industry has monitored
landings, it has usually monitored 100 per cent in order to ensure the completeness
of the monitoring process.
The Lake Erie fishery has the largest number of vessels of all rights based
programs. But It is a day fishery and has only six to eight landing sites. Observers
at landing sites ensure vessel quotas are not exceeded. These observers are em-
ployed by a company jointly owned by fishermen and processors and operate
under the aegis of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. Observers base
estimates on actual weighing of a 20 per cent sample of catches. If plant reports
are not within five per cent of the landing site observer estimate, a follow-up
investigation is initiated.
The fifty-five participants in the geoduck fishery on the Pacific coast have also
hired a private firm to monitor catches. To minimize costs, they have limited the
number of ports which are designated as landing sites. Moreover, only one or two
landing sites in the southern part of the province can be open at any time.
There are two Atlantic herring fisheries. 4RTVn and 4WX. both of which have
compliance problems. However, each has relatively few participants with 11 ves-
sels in the former and 40 in the latter. The number of potential landing sites,
however, is large and this has been the primary cause of problems. Without a
weightmaster or a fishery officer at the landing site, collusion among fishermen
and processors can assure successful misreporting of catches. Misreporting and
discarding at sea has meant that the (TACs) have not always been respected.
Nor is the problem unique to this fishery. A five year pilot program (1983-88)
for 4RS3Pn groundfish in western Newfoundland, which preceded the current
program, was plagued by discarding and misreporting. Participants in the current
program for the less-than-65-feet mobile fleet are now funding their own moni-
toring program by means of a levy on landings.
Are there conclusions to be drawn about the size of programs and number of
landing sites? Program design rather than numbers of participants has seemed to
be the primary ingredient of successful rights based programs. However, number
of landing sites can be important if there are insufficient resources to ensure
effective monitoring. Of course, the cost of monitoring can be borne by program
participants rather than governments and restricting numbers of ports, times of
operation, and sampling can be used to reduce costs.8 R. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
Transferability and Exit of Labour and Capital
Economic theorists state that tenure in perpetuity, transferability and divisibility
of quota entitlements are required to achieve efficiency. These conditions are not
fully met inany of the existing programs. Under the Fisheries Act, the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans reserves the right at his "absolute discretion" to change
even permanent rights based programs; hence, no true property rights to fish have
been created in law under any of these programs.
Full transferability and divisibility is a feature only of the Lake Erie ITQ
program. In the case of the 4RTVnWX Atlantic herring fisheries, there is re-
stricted transferability and divisibility. Transfers are allowed only when quota
held by a vessel are sold because a participant is exiting the fishery, at which time
quota are divisible. For Lake Winnipeg and the offshore programs, there are
restricted transferability provisions; the total licence must be purchased on a
permanent basis and it is not divisible.
These limits on transferability have not prevented consolidation and rational-
ization of harvesting capacity in rights based fisheries. Some data are presented in
Table 2 which show clearly the reduction in number of vessels that occurred after
rights based fisheries were introduced. Once implemented, rights based programs
produce adjustments that reduce the number of vessels and raise catches per
vessel. (In some fisheries, of course, rationalization of harvesting capacity is not
an issue. Northern shrimp, offshore clams and offshore tuna are all fisheries still
in process of development.) Incomes of crews have improved in all rights based
fisheries. For example, in the Lake Erie fishery, the number of crew decreased
from 915 to 714 and average incomes increased from around $25K to over $40K.
This all took place within a very short space of time (one year).
With respect to the Atlantic offshore groundfish fishery, side trawlers have
been replaced with more efficient stern trawlers. The number of companies in the
independent offshore group has declined from 18 in 1982 to 11 today. National Sea
Products (NSP) had 52 trawlers in 1982 but has only to 41 at present; Fishery
Products International (FPI) 71 in 1982 and 58 at present; other companies had 16
in 1982 and 16 now. FPI and NSP are large enough companies to realize the gains
from internal rationalization. Incomes of trawler crews grew moderately over the
period. The number of sea days per boat has increased for the two largest com-
Table 2



























Source; unpublished reportsRights Based Management 9
panies. Fisheries Products International (FPI) and National Sea Products (NSP),
though it has declined for other operators.
For offshore lobster, the number of vessels has stayed the same but the fleet
has been renewed with introduction of larger vessels. Average crew incomes grew
from under $20K in 1984 to over $40K in 1986. For offshore scallops the number
of license holders declined from 10 to seven. Crew incomes grew from $22K
before 1983 to $37K after !987. These rates of growth (15^0%) are considerably
above the rate that wages grew in the fisheries sector during the same period (7%).
For4RST and 3Pn groundfish, only limited success was achieved in shedding
excess capital and labour. Participants in the program still obtained some econ-
omies in harvesting variable costs by eliminating the race for fish.'' These savings
were realized to a larger extent in the other programs (cited above) where there
was also reduced excess capacity.
Overall, these programs (as does fisheries management generally) work best
when labour and capital can exit (enter) reasonably freely. Especially in Atlantic
Canada, concern with the employment objective means that this condition is not
usually met.
Quota VcUues
All rights based programs result in a value or price being placed on quota. This is
because quota convey a right to harvest (and implicitly sell) fish at prices greater
than marginal cost. Quota are scarce relative to demand, and price is the way the
market deals with scarcity. It is virtually impossible to determine these values
with any precision because government does not recognize their existence either
for fisheries policy or taxation purposes. Fishermen are understandingly wary of
discussing values/prices of their quota because of obvious implications. Most
quota trades are also part of a package which includes tangibles such as boats and
this further clouds the issue.
The only reasonably neutral source of information is newspaper notices ad-
vertising availability of licences and quota and stating an asking price. However,
these notices cover only a portion of sales and it is far from clear that they are
representative of the population. Table 3 presents some data from such sources,
but they should be treated with great caution. Nonetheless, these data clearly
indicate that governments have created considerable wealth as a result of limiting
entry and instituting rights based regimes.
Quota values are important because they can be used as a gross measure of the
benefits to the participants of a rights based program. For example, one per cent
of the 4WX herring TAC appears to be worth $76-100K.'^ This means that fish-
ermen are willing to pay this amount to participate because the limited number of
participants creates a preferred outcome.
" J. Jones and M. Murphy. D. Rowe. D. Dunn, "Toward an enterprise allocation program:
Review of past management and future options in the otter trawl fishery of Western New-
foundland", unpublished report. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. 1987. p. 17.
'~ D. A. MacFarlane, "An economic assessment of the herring purse-seine fleet restruc-
turing plan of 1983. the ten-year management plan at mid-term". Economic Commercial
Analysis Report No 31, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1989, p. 16.20 R. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
Table 3
Estimated Values of Licenses, by Fishery, March, 1990
Value of Licenses
Offshore Tuna Newfoundland $100,000
Crab Newfoundland/Nova Scotia $40,000-100.000
Capelin Newfoundland $8,000-12.000
Inshore Groundfish Newfoundland/Nova Scotia $10,000-100.000
Lobster P.E.I./Nova Scotia $40,000-50.000
Shrimp Quebec $50,000-75.000
Scallop New Brunswick/Nova Scotia $100,000-200.000







Source: Data are based on informal surveys of a variety of sources (local fisheries
ofiicers. fishermen, lawyers, local fisheries trade publications, newspapers). They should
be considered only as "ballpark" estimates.
The 4WX Purse Seine Herring Fishery'''
The purse seine herring fishery in zone 4WX was developed as a fish meal fishery
in the early 1960s to produce fish meal. Uncontrolled expansion of both fleet and
plants coupled with low meal prices led to a near collapse of this fishery in 1974.
The government intervened and barred the entry of additional purse seiners in
1974 pending a study of the problem. The study resulted in what were radical
interventions in 1976. These interventions consisted of:
• Ban on harvesting herring for fish meal.
• Vessel quotas with daily and weekly catch limits to match processing ca-
pacity and designed to equalize catches among fishermen.
• Government assistance to fishermen to acquire the purse seine fleet, explic-
itly separating harvesting from the processing.
• Price support payments.
Processing companies were compensated for redundant capital as a result of
lost fish meal production. Assistance was provided in such a way that they could
acquire capacity to produce food herring. And perhaps most significant of all, the
Atlantic Herring Fishermen's Marketing Cooperative was established to control
harvesting and marketing of fresh herring.
Managing 4WX herring stock has always been a challenge. In terms of biology
'^ The authoritative references on the early years In this fishery are: Harry F. Campbell,
"TbeBay of Fundy Herring Fishery", Ottawa, Economic Council of Canada. 1981; and F.
Gregory Peacock of Dougald A. MacFarlane. "A Review of Quasi-Property Rights in the
Herring Purse Seine Fishery of the Scotia-Fundy Region of Canada" in Nina Mollett (ed).
Fishery Access Control Programs Worldwide, Proceedings of the Workshop on Manage-






























































Source: R. L. Stephenson and M. J. Power, "Assessment of the 1988
4WX herring fishery'', DFO unpublished CAFSAC Research Document.
89/59, Table 3, p. 15.
"... the 4WX Atlantic herring management unit is clearly not a population in any
definable ecological sense".'" A retrospective look in 1983 at the 1978 stock
assessment done indicated that ". . . the 1978 assessment overestimated stock
size of the most recent year by about 90 per cent, and the quota derived by
applying the management strategy fishing mortality (in this case FO.l from the
analytical model) to the stock size was too high by the same margin".'^
Assessments of this fishery were even more difficult because of the state of
near anarchy in quota compliance. One analysis of under reporting (Mace, 1985)
estimated that 50 per cent of catches were not reported in some years. The effects
of this are presented in Table 4.
The 1976 intervention gradually broke down. The Fishermen's Marketing Co-
op sphntered into rival groups. Misreporting became rampant with increasing
collusion between fishermen and processors. By 1985, the Department of Fish-
eries and Oceans was spending $500,000 (total departmental enforcement budget
in 1985 was $43.1 millions) on enforcement at the twenty odd landing sites. This
was a 42 vessel fishery worth about $20 million (about one per cent of total
Atlantic fishery) in 1985. Enforcement efforts have subsequently been stepped up,
but still with only limited success.
As late as 1978, new large seiners were added to the fieet. This added capacity
created pressure for an already overcapitalized fleet to cheat on quotas. In 1979,
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans tried limited fleet separation to address
existing problems. The number of purse seine vessels was limited in the Gulf of St.
'** M. Sinclair, V. C. Anthony, T. D. lies and R. N. O'Boyle, "Stock assessment problems
in Atlantic herring in the Northwest Atlantic". Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic
Science. 1985, p. 891.
'^ Ibid, P. 890.12 R.W. Crowley and H. Palsson
Lawrence and each vessel received a reduced allocation to protect stocks and give
more herring to inshore gillneters. But pressure on the 4WX herring stock did not
abate, and probably increased.
The 1982 Report of the Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries (Kirby) devoted an
entire Chapter (Chapter 20) to discussing the herring seine fleet. It recommended
that government: "Implement immediately the assignment of transferable vessel
quota to seiners, with the initial allocation distributed on the basis of relative
catches in the past three years. The program would be managed by a board elected
by current licence holders, with a federally appointed chairman.""*
The Report also recommended a buy-back program in the herring fishery, and
the adoption of "stringent measures to prevent misreporting of landings." The
government accepted these recommendations, though it never did institute a buy-
back program. In August 1983, two new interventions were made.
1. Fleet Separation: Part of the fleet (Scotia-Fundy fleet) was given exclusive
access to Bay of Fundy and Chedabucto Bay (4WX) while another part
(Gulf fleet) was given exclusive access in The Gulf of St. Lawrence and
portion of Sydney Bight (4RT and 4Vn).'^
2. Fleet Reduction: the combination of vessel quotas through purchases was
to be encouraged within these two distinct fleets.
To ensure that investments in additional quota would not be diluted, the Min-
ister of Fisheries and Oceans guaranteed the percentage shares between the in-
shore and purse seine sectors for a ten year period. The Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans further guaranteed the following conditions for the Scotia-Fundy purse
seine fleet:
• 80 per cent of the 4WX TAC would be assigned to purse seine vessels.
• no increase in the number of licences.
• no change in vessel quota policy.
The 49 vessel Scotia-Fundy'** fleet was divided among 27 Class A licences
(1.6% of 4WX TAC), 15 Class B licences (2.7% of TAC) and 7 Class C licences
(2.33% of TAC)'^ (See Table 5). The trade and transfer of quotas was restricted by
the Minister as follows:
• Class A could purchase class A.
• Class B could purchase class B.
• Class C could purchase class C.
• Class A or B could purchase Class C providing certain criteria were met.
'* Report of the Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries, p. 336.
'"^ Canada's Atlantic Region is divided into four fisheries management districts: (1) Scotia-
Fundy consists of part of the Atlantic and the Bay of Fundy. (2) Gulf consists of the Gulf
of St. Lawrence (excluding the part abuuing Quebec). (3) Newfoundland consists of the
North Atlantic, and (4) Quebec connects the part of the Gulf of St. Lawrence abutting the
Province of Quebec (see figure I).
'*• Sixteen seiners based in the Gulf of St. Lawrence are ignored for the remainder of this
paper.
^ Licences were classed as follows: Class A: Fishermen owned vessels with no history of
participation in the 4W fishery during the period 1980-83 (non mobile). Class B: Fishermen
owned vessels which participated in the 4W fLshery during the period 1980-83. Class C:
Vessels owned by herring processors either mobile or non mobile.Rights Based Management 13
Table 5























Source: DFO (Scotia-Fundy Region) Fisheries Management Plan:
Herring 1983-1988.
Other rules regarding quota trades reinforced the restrictiveness and nar-
rowed the scope for fleet rationalization. In particular,
• Owners of licensed vessels were allowed to accumulate quota not exceeding
four per cent of the total.
• Any number of license holders was allowed to participate in the purchase of
quota; however, a seller was required to divest his entire quota and exit the
fishery on a permanent basis.
• Upon purchasing a quota, all purchasers were required to install or have a
circulating fish chilling system to enhance landed quality.
No length or tonnage restrictions were applied to vessel replacement.
The purse seine fleet reform package was restrictive. It fell short of assigning
full rights to the purse seine licence holders, but it represented one of the most
clearly defined property rights to fish in Canada.
Indeed, the program has many provisions which hinder trading in rights. Spe-
cifically, the three vessel classes and the discrimination against backward inte-
gration with herring processors work to frustrate fleet rationalization. There is no
economic reason for the four per cent limitation on TAC ownership, other pos-
sibly than to maximize employment.
The fact that the regime could expire within a ten year period has restricted its
usefulness in rationalizing the fleet; as well, unless the current program is ex-
tended, there will be a so-called "last period problem" in 1993. Quota owners will
wonder whether and how many new licences could be issued in 1993. This com-
plicates decision making and creates an extra source of uncertainty. Another
complicating factor is limited quota monitoring. If quota owners can acquire her-
ring without buying quota, they have little incentive to purchase quota. Moreover,
because the 4WX herring stock is not discrete, access outside the 4WX manage-
ment area must be controlled to ensure a stable rights based fishery.
Some of these problems are not as unsurmountable as they might appear. Fleet
rationalization has taken place and a market in quota has developed. Based on
available (largely anecdotal) data, the price for one per cent of the 4WX purse
seine herring quota since 1979 has ranged between $76,000 and $96,000 with no
trend. In 1988, a4 per cent quota was 5,132 tonnes of herring plus 104.0 tonnes in
bait.
In summary, the rights based approach has helped to create a viable herring
fishery in 4WX. The "right to herring" has been moderately successful as an14 R. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
instrument for rationalizing the 4WX purse seine fleet, but who knows how suc-
cessful it could have been if there had been no restriction on transferability.
The Offshore GroundHsh Fishery
The Canadian offshore groundfish fleet expanded rapidly in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Operators wanted to increase their share of offshore catches before
Canada declared a 200 mile fishing zone. However, the federal government im-
posed limited entry and vessel replacement restrictions (foot for foot and tonne for
tonne) in 1973 to fight the overcapitalization that was occurring in the offshore
fleet. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans in addition unilaterally canceled
about 30 inactive offshore trawler licences in 1980. This reduced the number of
trawler licences from 170 to about 140.
In 1977 the government established the Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan.
Fish stocks were divided between Canadian and foreign allocations. The Cana-
dian allocation was further split between offshore and inshore. Both the offshore
and the inshore allocations were available to be fished on an open access basis. It
was soon determined that this was a recipe for disaster.
In 1981. the offshore quota of northern cod (NAFO zones 2J3KL, see Figure
1) was caught within seven weeks of the start of the year. Through the late 1970s
the fishery had remained open to the end of April before the offshore TAC was
exhausted. Similar developments were also occurring with respect to other
stocks.
Many subsequently charged the offshore companies with disorderly and ruin-
ous harvesting. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans called for the race for the
fish to end. The larger offshore companies of the day—National Sea Products.
Fishery Products, H. B. Nickerson and the Lake Group—devised the system of
Enterprise Allocations. This quota scheme carved up the offshore fishery into
company allocations by stock areas based on historical catches and adjacency.
The "Big Four" left a pool offish to be caught on a competitive basis by a group
of smaller companies usually referred to as the Independent Offshore Group
(lOG). The Minister announced the "experimental" EA program in 1982.
Following acceptance of the Report of the Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries,
the Government of Canada began to restructure the Atlantic fisherieas."" In 1983,
it suspended the new EA system to prevent the sale or transfer of quota. The
delicate political balance among Canadian provinces required quota stability by
province during discussions for a long term program. Anything less could have
triggered a movement for provincial (rather than company) quota. The offshore
companies did keep the EA program on an informal basis, however, and it was
reintroduced in 1984 for a five year trial period.
Under the Enterprise Allocation program, quota are provided to National Sea
Products Ltd.. Fishery Products International Ltd. and the Independent Offshore
Group (a group of smaller companies) as a percentage share of total offshore
allocations (normally about 50 per cent of the total Canadian TAC). Table 6
provides a summary of EA allocations over the period 1982 to 1990. The program
is managed through published regulations, monitoring of company reports, use of
^"In 1983. Parliament passed the Atlantic Fisheries Restructuring Act to facilitate this
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Source: DFO Resource Allocation Branch, Atlantic Fisheries, unpublished reports.
on-board observers, and spot checks by DFO enforcement vessels. This program
does not permit trading of quota but does permit bartering of allocations (one
species for another) among program participants in any given year.
The permanent EA system introduced in 1984 was modified in 1986 after
extensive consultations with industry and the provinces. The following changes
were made:
• A formula was adopted to share TAC declines among EA participants.
• Access fees were charged, based on each company's EAs.
• Individual percentage shares were established for companies in the Inde-
pendent Offshore Group.
• A reserve was established to improve utilization of EA's.
The Department of Fisheries and Oceans, in consultation with provincial Min-
istries, further reviewed and evaluated the EA program in 1987-88 in preparation
for the end of the first trial period in 1989. The evaluation focused on five objec-
tives:
1. EAs should reduce or eliminate the annual "race for fish".
2. EAs should reduce harvesting costs by encouraging better fleet utilization.
3. EAs should promote more efficient processing operations.
4. EAs should encourage increased fish quality.
5. EAs should promote deregulation of the fishery.
How did the program fare? Below, we look in turn at each of the above
objectives.
Objective I: Eliminating the Race for Fish
The long established race for fish resulted in gluts at plants and the production of
too many fish blocks (rather than fillets or other more profitable product forms).
As well, the concentration of production at the beginning of the year increased the
cost of carrying product inventories. The evidence is fairly conclusive that the EAi6 R. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
program resulted in offshore effort being spread more evenly throughout the year.
Capacity came to be used on a year round basis and there was a marked reduction
in the production of blocks.
Objective 2: Reduced Harvesting Costs
The majority of economic benefits from EAs was expected to flow from meeting
this objective. Following implementation of EAs, there was an overall downward
trend in the number of vessels (see Table 7), but this does not tell the whole story.
The fleet had been old and largely out of date at the start of the EA program. Most
side trawlers would probably have been replaced by trawlers without the pro-
gram. Since stern trawlers are more efficient than side trawlers, it is hard to draw
conclusions on what the reduced number of harvesting days meant for overall
effort (Table 8). To help clarify this. Table 9 provides an index of effort per
trawler.
These data are still difficult to interpret. Both FPI and the IOG were affected
by trawlermen strikes in 1984-85. As well, restructuring disrupted operations of
FPI's predecessor companies operations during 1983. Trawler utilization appears
to have improved after EAs were introduced in 1982. But it should be noted that
improvement can mean fewer sea days per trawler in a fixed quota regime (such
as is the case for the IOG quota). Both FPI and NSP have containerized catches
and staying out longer means they are handling their catches more efficiently.
(Both FPI and NSP have further to sail than most members of the IOG which
explains to some extent the different adjustment strategies.)
Table 8 presents data on catch rates by vessel and by sea day. It confirms a
general productivity improvement in catches by all offshore operators. This could
be due to:
• Stock recovery.
• Technological improvement (stern trawlers replacing side trawlers).
• Enterprise allocations.
Table 7
Number of Offshore Vessels, by Company, 1978-88
Fishery Independent
National Products Offshore
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Source: DFO, Resource Allocation Branch. Atlantic Fisheries, unpublished reports.
Rationalization within the IOG has proceeded through mergers. There were
approximately 18 companies in the IOG in 1982; now there are 11. These mergers
obscure the issue of transferability since they essentially accomplished the same
end as full transferability.
Companies have become increasingly attractive as takeover targets as quota
become more valuable. The British Columbia Egg Marketing Board had egg quo-
tas "tied" to farms from 1967-76. The number of producers declined by almost
half through mergers.~' Tied quotas did not prevent consolidation, so producer
quota became transferable after 1976. Similar reforms could be contemplated for
the offshore EA program.
Objective 3: Promote More Efficient Processing Operations
Production became more uniform throughout the year compared to the pre-EA
regime. As a result, plants were more efficiently utilized under the EA regime than
they had been before.
There is also some evidence, largely qualitative, of more specialized produc-
tion by National Sea Products and Fishery Products International. Both compa-
nies have designated plants by species and as appropriate, trawlers are directed to
those plants rather than to a designated home port. Specialized production of new
consumer packs such as microwave fish trays has also been a positive develop-
ment.
There is a general agreement in the industry that both FPI and NSP are more
market driven than they were before EAs were introduced. The management of
both companies changed radically with 1983-84 restructuring. Gardner (1988)
analyzed this aspect of NSP and concluded that the company had "... gone from
supply driven to a demand driven organization . . ." as the result of EAs.^^
^' T. Borcherding and G. W. Dorosh, The Egg Marketing Board: A Case Study of Mo-
nopoly and Its Social Costs, Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1981. p. 13.
^' Michael Gardner, "The enterprise allocation system in the offshore groundfish sector in
Atlantic Canada", in P. A. Nehr, R. Arnason, and N. Mollett (eds.). Rights Based Fishing,
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Scientific Foundations for
Rights Based Fishing, Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. pp. 293-320.18 R. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
Table 9
Indexes (1982 ^ 100) of Average Sea Days Per Trawler






















































Source: Calculations based on DFO, Resource Allocation
Branch, Atlantic Fisheries, unpublished reports..
Objective 4: EAs Should Encourage Increased fish Quality
A number of qualitative indicators indicate improvements in fish quality. Most
important, containerization has replaced bulk storage aboard trawlers. Thirty
seven such conversions have been completed or are planned. These conversions
sacrifice carrying capacity for quality enhancing storage.
The introduction of trawl windows to limit tow size and reduce fish damage
has complemented containerization. Dockside grading has been introduced to the
NSP fleet to reward quality landings. FPI has moved in the same direction.
Objective 5: EAs Should Provide Deregulation of the Fishery
This objective has not yet been met. To prevent discards, DFO has instituted
observer coverage for 100 per cent of foreign and 50 per cent of domestic offshore
trawler fleet operation. Quota monitoring has also been a demanding activity in
the context of EAs. And recent new regulations on net mesh etc. further compli-
cate this situation, reducing the flexibility of companies to operate without regu-
lations.
The regulations that became redundant under EAs, like seasonal closures and
trip limits, were never very important in offshore groundfish management in Can-
ada. In short, there is scope for considerable improvement in this area.
Conclusions
Canada has had limited but important experience with rights based fisheries man-
agement. As this article was being completed, new applications of such schemes
were being made in fisheries such as Nova Scotia groundfish. This experience has







































































































Source: Same as Table 9.
First, although economic theorists would not give Canadian rights based re-
gimes high marks for completeness, there have been efficiency gains from grant-
ing rights and ensuring resource rent capture. Second, enforcement of rights is
costly and demanding. If fleets are overcapitalized at the start of a rights based
regime, there are pressures to cheat on quota. These can be avoided only by
effective monitoring, which in turn is costly. Third, quota have been traded under
EAs despite legal discouragement. Considerable wealth has been created and
economic decisions are based on this wealth. For example, offshore companies on
the Atlantic coast have been purchased as much for their EAs as for their business
assets. Similarly, vessel quota in 4WX have been traded at considerable value
despite restrictive conditions on such trades. Ways to recapture publicly these
increased values need to be explored.
Neither biological factors nor the objective of maximizing employment appear
to have been serious impediments to success in any of the existing Canadian rights
based programs. The absence of divisibility and ready transferability has possibly
slowed but not prevented the consolidation and rationalization of rights based
program fisheries. Conservation pressures have complicated the application of
rights based regimes, but overall they have not been a serious restraint. Most
rights based program fisheries have shed both labour and capital, and the ability
to do this is a important ingredient of success. Incomes of rights based program
fishermen have in many instances increased substantially. Based on anecdotal
evidence, quota in all rights based fisheries have become quite valuable.
The overall lesson from the Canadian experience is that a system of property
rights can yield substantial benefits, even if the rights are attenuated. It is not a
disaster if the original design includes extraneous objectives such as employment
maximization or regional segregation of quotas. In any case, a regime can be
refined over time with the active support of participants. The direction of Cana-20 R. W. Crowley and H. Palsson
dian fisheries policy has been beneficial, though the pace and extent of change
could be considerably enhanced.
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